In the 1990s the Channel Tunnel finally provided a physical union between Britain and France. Emotionally and attitudinally, however, the British and French still regard each other warily. Perhaps encouraged by the new geographic linkage, and certainly assisted by the release of archives, historians have re-examined many aspects of relations between these once 'troubled neighbours'. 1 This volume seeks to fill a gap by presenting new research on the defence relationship, focusing on the era between the two world wars . 2 The inter-war climate between the British and French armed services reflected the atmosphere of wider Anglo-French relations. In the early and mid-1920s 'there were no overriding threats to Britain', as John R. Ferris has remarked. 'Any grand strategy would necessarily be speculative, an approach which Whitehall disliked.' 3 All the same a haze, if not yet any dark storm-clouds, was starting to dim the sun that many fondly supposed might perpetually shine on Britain's empire. The Washington naval limitations conference of 1921-22 precipitated the end of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. This increasingly obliged British defence planners (institutionalized in the Committee of Imperial Defence and its chiefs of staff sub-committee) to contemplate Japan as a possible future enemy.
However, British plans in the 1920s took seriously the possibility that France, too, might be an adversary rather than an ally. The programmes designed to expand the Royal Air Force in 1921-25 particularly reflected this pessimistic outlook for Anglo-French strategic relations. 4 French policies and France's far-reaching military presence in Europe after the conclusion of the Paris peace treaties were thought, in London, to be suspiciously hegemonic. Besides the privileged commercial relations France concluded with newly-independent states in east-central Europe such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, the signs of French influence included the establishment in 1919 of a military mission under General Louis Pellé in Prague and the appointment in 1921 of another French officer, General Louis Faury, as the first commandant of the Polish Army staff college. 5 Many British statesmen and defence chiefs estimated that French policies had the potential to provoke international tensions and even give grounds for a new war. 6 During this time, furthermore, the United States declined to underwrite French security, Congress in 1920 rejecting pleas from Paris for a post-war guarantee of military protection, and also declining to take the USA into the newborn League of Nations. 7 In Whitehall, just as in Washington, scant sympathy existed in either political or military circles for French feelings of insecurity. Britain unsurprisingly followed the American suit, declining to push through any concrete outcome to the 1920-22 negotiations for a pact with France and Belgium. 1923-24 (and again in 1926-29) made for clashes of personality and policy with British officials. From a French standpoint, Britain did too much to aid the economic and political re-integration of the defeated but latently powerful enemy, Germany, and too little to provide long-term security to the victorious but severely mauled ally, France. 9 The Locarno Treaty of December 1925 seemed to promise two-fold relief to France: on the one hand, an unforced German pledge not to seek to alter by force the borders with France and Belgium; on the other, a British (and Italian) underwriting of the treaty. Locarno, however, was not underpinned by any Anglo-French military staff talks or operational planning. 10 The logistical, intelligence and operational dimensions to a punitive action if Germany reneged on her signature were never worked out. This left French diplomats and defence planners uneasily aware of the misalignment between British defence policy and British diplomatic undertakings. A France brought close to the limit of her endurance in 1917, even with Britain as an ally, deeply feared the ephemeral quality of postwar security arrangements.
11 These, French leaders felt, left a far more potent, populous Germany ringed not by watchful bayonets but by pious words on pieces of paper. As expressed in a metaphor used by General Louis Maurin, French minister for war, in April 1935, a month after Germany violated Versailles by re-establishing a conscripted army:
Germany had hitherto been surrounded by a wall of paper; within that wall she had grown and had provided herself with formidable military means [. . .] It was impossible to foretell with any accuracy in what direction the armed force of Germany would move once the wall of paper was completely torn down. 12 At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s Anglo-French relations had cooled, however. This was in part because the erstwhile allies took sharply contrasting views of the philosophy and specific proposals embodied in the World Disarmament Conference. Neither in the meetings of its preparatory commissions from 1929, nor in the main sessions of the conference, was Anglo-French convergence and co-operation much in evidence, as Andrew Webster's chapter here (Chapter 3) makes clear. 13 The conference proper convened at Geneva in February 1932. Severely damaged by Germany's walk-out in October 1933, it staggered on into 1934.
In the naval sphere, the French remained aggrieved by the terms of the Washington treaty of 1922, which had placed the French on a par with their Mediterranean rivals, the Italians. 14 In the air, the French showed a greater enthusiasm for total prohibition of bomber aircraft than did the British. The latter increasingly turned, in the early and mid1930s, to designing and producing longer-range bombers as the most cost-effective weapon to preserve peace through deterrence (embracing the creed that 'the bomber will always get through', in the chilling words of Stanley Baldwin, then leader of the Conservative Party, in the House of Commons in November 1932). 15 Faith that bombers packed the greatest punch for the taxpayer's pound even resisted the pressure in the late 1930s for all-out emphasis on fighters and anti-aircraft guns to defend the skies over Great Britain. After Munich the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, argued in Cabinet in November 1938 that 'if our real aim was to prevent war it was necessary that we should also have a sufficient bomber force to ensure that any country wishing to attack us would realise that the game was not worth the candle.' cuts. Behind British pressure lay a hope that concessions by France might keep an increasingly truculent Germany at the conference table. General Maxime Weygand, French army inspector-general and commander-in-chief designate between 1931 and January 1935, could not understand British policy. Successive governments steared clear of staff talks or military planning designed to flesh out Britain's Locarno commitment to preserve the Franco-Belgian-German frontiers. 17 Weygand 'found it difficult to follow us', reported Colonel Gordon Heywood, the British military attaché, in March 1933, 'when we advocated a policy, namely the reduction of French armaments to such a level as to make an attack the more likely and which thereby increased the chances of England having to honour her signature'. 18 Particularly resisted by French generals was the plan put up in 1933, over the signature of Ramsay MacDonald (then the British prime minister), to permit the German Reichswehr's expansion to a peacetime force of 300,000 men. In October 1933 Germany did quit the conference. On 17 April 1934 Louis Barthou, then French foreign minister, issued a note that signalled a return by those responsible for French security to reliance on 'old fashioned' alliances and refurbished military defences. 19 French army and navy commanders smarted over the erosion of armed strength resulting from support for the League of Nations and collective security, accompanied by reduced spending on military training and modern weapons. They felt that too many revisions of Versailles had been made, all in Germany's favour. Some claimed to have lost confidence that the French standing army could guarantee the national territory from a sneak attack, une attaque brusqée. 20 From about 1931, numerous 'friends of the French army', including well-briefed journalists, retired officers and writers using pseudonyms, penned articles for the Revue Militaire Générale and the Revue des Deux Mondes. Their aim was to raise doubts whether the 'skeletonised' forces could preserve the sacrosanct 'inviolability of national territory', and to force ministers to undo what were seen as baleful 'pro-Geneva' cuts in budgets and first-line troop levels. 21 In May 1934 Weygand mobilized a protest from the entire membership of the French army's board, the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (CSG). The generals signed a formal note registering alarm at the tilting military balance. It recommended urgent investment to revive the French army. It cited statistics on imminent German military strength and reflected Weygand's hostility to the effects of the disarmament process. 22 In January 1935, six days before retiring, Weygand repeated his warnings in a valedictory statement to the CSG. 23 British documents from this time reveal the great distance that the Channel represented in terms of the respective perceptions of the European military balance. We have seen how French strategists fretted that Germany was contained by just a flimsy 'wall of paper'. The contrasting British official perspective was elegantly expressed in November 1933 by Orme Sargent, deputy under-secretary at the Foreign Office:
No doubt a convincing case can be made out to show that if Great Britain were committed to an alliance with France there would be no German danger. But the British public at present do not look at the matter in this way: they prefer to live dangerously without commitments, rather than securely with them -and perhaps they are right. 25 Even the War Office was unsympathetic to complaints from Weygand and others, seeing them as unduly alarmist and 'typically French' histrionics. Its military intelligence division, MI3, opined after Hitler re-introduced conscription in March 1935 that 'it is not thought that a peace strength of thirty-six divisions is excessive in view of the strategic position of Germany, the length of her frontiers and the armed strength of neighbouring powers '. 26 Against this backdrop, relations between the British and French air forces make a revealing case study -and, lacking a chapter to themselves in this collection, they merit extended scrutiny now. During the 1920s the RAF (Royal Air Force) was an independent service, formed on 1 April 1918. It was viewed with some jealousy by the Royal Navy and British army. Those wearing the RAF's light blue uniform were newcomers, even upstarts, who demanded financial resources that might otherwise have remained with those in navy blue and khaki. With the RAF desperate for arguments to fight its corner in Whitehall, France performed a crucial function. For as the nearest continental power and the most militarily powerful one, France was a useful yardstick against which the RAF could measure its own claims for men, money and aircraft. As noted earlier, it was against a hypothesis of bombing raids by a French air force that Fighter Command had, in the early 1920s, claimed to need 52 metropolitan RAF squadrons for home air defence. 27 Ironically, France at this point had many aircraft but no air force. That is, no independent third French service existed with which the RAF could have a relationship (albeit that in 1928 a minister for air, Fernand Laurent, was added to the government). In 1933 the advent of a young, dynamic, and personally ambitious air minister, Pierre Cot, changed this. Cot instigated the rapid development of a separate French air force (the Armée de l'Air). He quickly equipped the service with an air war council (Conseil Supérieur de l'Air), an air staff with an air intelligence branch, an Air War College (Ecole Supérieur de l'Air), and air attachés posted to the most important French embassies and legations abroad. 28 Despite the usefulness of the 'French bogeyman' to boost the case for the home RAF, British air forces in the 1920s and early 1930s were largely occupied in imperial policing and colonial defence. 29 Only from the mid-1930s onwards did Anglo-French air co-operation become substantive, particularly from 1935 when German rearmament became overt. In 1935-36 Anglo-French air staff talks occurred, on account of the risk of war after Italy invaded Abyssinia. 30 At this juncture France appeared to be in the driving seat as far as bilateral developments were concerned. Cot had initiated air rearmament in 1933, and this had been continued by the air minister in the period 1934-35, General Victor Denain. His Plan II for French air rearmament set a target of a front-line force of 1,050 modern aircraft.
The RAF gained a further reason for working more intimately with the French. In the pre-radar era, as this still was, any German air raids directed at cities, ports or factories in Britain would have to pass through Belgian and/or French air space en route to targets in the United Kingdom. Britain grasped that her warning time of inbound raiders, and thus RAF Fighter Command's ability to 'scramble' fighter squadrons to climb to combat altitude and seek to intercept German attacks, would be massively enhanced by access to the network of Franco-Belgian airraid alert stations ( postes de guet). These were connected by telephone lines to the fighter and anti-aircraft artillery controllers of the Belgian and French territorial air defence commands. It became a matter of utmost value to British home defence to become linked into this early warning system. By 1936-37, however, leadership and self-confidence in the crossChannel air relationship had dramatically shifted its locus. British air intelligence and diplomatic sources in Paris anxiously watched as French air rearmament stalled, and then ground almost to a halt, amid political recriminations and partisanship. The warning signs appeared even in 1934, as the Armée de l'Air launched its Plan II. 'Now that the material of the French air force is to be renewed', minuted M. J. Cresswell at the Foreign Office, 'the general reserves may be expected to increase in number, but decrease (relatively) in quality very rapidly -until it is possible to re-equip the reserves as well. . . . There will be a moment when the old reserves will be practically valueless.' 31 But most damage to French air strength was inflicted, British observers felt sure, by Pierre Cot. His reappointment to the French air ministry in June 1936 was the work of Léon Blum's left-centre Popular Front government. Cot's ideas had a long-term soundness, indeed were in many cases essential. He understood that French aircraft production was hopelessly artisanal, fragmented among too many under-capitalized and inefficient firms, and dangerously concentrated in the industrial suburbs around Paris. These were too near to Germany, as modern aircraft developed larger payloads and longer ranges -and thus were exposed to a pre-emptive Luftwaffe strike at the very start of a war. Cot sponsored legislation in the summer of 1936 to nationalize large parts of the airframe and aero-engine industries. This was accompanied by decrees ordering the manufacturing companies Gnome-et-Rhône, Hispano-Suiza, Aviation Bloch-Dassault and Dewoitine to relocate their production to the provinces, and especially to cities in southern and south-western France, such as Toulouse. This was to distance them from Germany and reduce their exposure to destruction by Luftwaffe raids.
Strategic though these moves undeniably were, their short-and medium-term impact was disastrous. The left-wing and ideological character of the nationalizations caused furious controversy in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It also aroused opposition to the minister and his policies among conservative French air force generals. Meanwhile the physical relocation of aircraft factories caused a catastrophic slide in monthly aircraft output. 32 The British monitored this crisis with growing consternation. 33 Across the Channel, meanwhile, 1936-37 saw the RAF receive top priority in British rearmament and special favour from Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931 to May 1937, and then prime minister. The lamentable condition of the French air force by 1937-38, and the politicization of its administration and doctrine under Cot, struck many British officials and politicians as proof of French unreliability and weakness. 34 This was not a France with which many British ministers, civil servants or military officers wished to become allied. 35 Yet if the RAF had a privileged place in British rearmament policy in these years, the French judged the results to be a hindrance to closer Anglo-French strategic interests and defensive co-ordination. In the spring of 1937 exchanges of intelligence and technical information occurred between the RAF and the Armée de l'Air. 36 Meanwhile disagreement ran strongly in Whitehall. Might Britain one day have to assume a role again in the defence of Belgium and France? What would be the most effective and cost-efficient form of British military assistance in such an eventuality? 'It is not possible in the absence of experience of a war between first class air powers', noted a view from Britain's service chiefs cited with approval by General Hastings Ismay, assistant secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, in July 1937, 'to say whether or not air forces can stop armies . . . we agree that the allies must be capable of placing in the field considerable land forces if they are to stop a German onslaught on land'. 37 This left open the question of whether the 'considerable land forces' could be supplied exclusively by France, perhaps supplemented by Belgium, with any British contribution to continental defence strictly limited to aircraft. In London the advocates of air power were eloquent: aircraft promised the maximum deterrent value for money. Moreover, French air weakness made the wisdom of giving priority to RAF programmes in 1937-38 appear irrefutable. British air rearmament only switched emphasis after the Inskip Report of December 1937, which reduced the priority for heavy bombers able to strike at the German industrial and urban heartland, thereby raising the role of Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB). In part the change reflected adventitious but crucial technological breakthroughs: the coming of the first functional radar warning stations in 1937, and the proving of a new generation of monoplane, single-seat, fast fighter aircraft, the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire (first prototypes of each having flown in 1934 and 1936 respectively). By 1937-38 Hurricanes were re-equipping the fighter defence squadrons of the UK, whilst the first squadron of operational Spitfires entered service in 1938.
The RAF and Armée de l'Air were liaising intensively at this time. Cot personally held discussions with the British Secretary of State for Air, Viscount Swinton, in December 1937. Indeed Cot's removal from the air ministry in January 1938 and replacement by the urbane and uncontroversial Guy La Chambre promised even closer co-operation between the RAF and the Armée de l'Air. The French strengthened their embassy in London, posting an air attaché with the rank of colonel. French aeroengineers visited the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough in February 1938 and, in March, air staff officers held talks. 38 That summer the French were given details of the airfields, fuel supply and storage, and ground logistical support required by the RAF if it were to deploy an Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) to northern France. By the Munich crisis of September 1938 preparations were well advanced for an AASF of 20 squadrons, each of 16 aircraft, organized in two Bomber Groups: in total, 320 bomber aircraft. 39 By September 1938 French military and political leaders, including General Maurice Gamelin, the prime minister Edouard Daladier and the foreign minister Georges Bonnet, were drawing satisfaction from the increasing firmness apparent about RAF commitment to the Continent. Britain agreed to deploy the first Group of ten bomber squadrons on the allocated bases in France by the end of the first month of war; and the next ten squadrons during the second month. The air staffs discussed landings at French air force bases by RAF fighters running low on fuel after pursuing German raiders across the Channel; standardization of radio frequencies and communications procedures; aircraft recognition arrangements to permit French air controllers to identify RAF planes; and French refuelling of RAF formations. 40 But soon after the Munich dénouement, the fast pace towards air co-ordination slowed again. This was not of French doing. Rather, the attenuation of air staff co-ordination resulted from changes on the British side of the Channel: the appointment of Air Marshal Hugh Dowding as Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command in 1937 and priority thereafter for construction of an integrated system of 'Chain Home' radar stations. These, initially stretching from the Isle of Wight to East Anglia, were linked by telephone and wireless to the new RAF fighter bases, now organized into sectors and groups.
These developments dismayed the French, whose chief of air staff, General Joseph Vuillemin, had warned in March and September 1938 that war with Germany in the near future would see the Armée de l'Air 'annihilated in two weeks'. 41 On the one hand, the increased priority for defending British air space was bound to keep RAF fighter squadrons in the United Kingdom. The RAF's technological and organizational improvements had removed much of the value of France and Belgium to provide advance warning of Luftwaffe raids, reducing the need to base major RAF fighter assets east of the Channel to engage raiders over France and Belgium. Dowding and his commanders now presented the British authorities with a prospect of intercepting bombers over the Channel or at the English coast. On the other hand, the proponents of a heavy RAF bomber force as 'the best deterrent to avoid war' remained, and included Kingsley Wood who had succeeded Swinton as air minister in May 1938. In a statement on the air programme to the Cabinet in November 1938, Wood presented the RAF's pressing needs as firstly to build reserve strength in depth; secondly to increase the proportion of squadrons equipped with the latest aircraft types; and thirdly to concentrate on fighters. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, and Neville Chamberlain were pleased. 'Such a programme', remarked Simon approvingly, 'was manifestly defensive'. The Cabinet authorized the air staff's full programme of 3,700 additional fighters, half of which were to be ordered immediately.
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The French correctly discerned that these decisions in London would curb the size of the air force that Britain would forward-deploy into France. 43 Given the parlous state of their own air rearmament in 1938-39, French anxiety was understandable and justified. The story of Anglo-French air force relations is thus another narrative of efforts in parallel that never fused into an integrated, unitary air strategy. The unravelling of Anglo-French air defence into something close to 'each ally for himself' in 1940 was something incipient in the poorly stitched fabric of pre-war air relations. 44 Between the armies, too, relations ebbed and flowed. They too reflected the wider context of the Anglo-French political and diplomatic relationship, and the perceptions in London and Paris of the degree of threat to peace in Europe at particular moments. During the 1920s, although Britain did not guarantee France militarily, there was substantial co-operation between elements of the army general staffs. This stemmed from the maintenance by both entente powers of substantial land forces on German territory, enforcing the Versailles Treaty and supporting the work of the Inter-Allied Control Commission. The British army of occupation, stationed at Cologne and Düsseldorf, adjoined the French troops garrisoning the central part of the Rhineland (headquartered at Mainz).
Political differences between the governments, notably over how to react to German non-payment of reparations and the subsequent French military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923-24, made for tensions from time to time. Nevertheless the presence of armies enforcing the 1919 peace settlement inside Germany, along with the British and French teams on the Inter-Allied Commission, ensured a continuing familiarity. There was a considerable store of knowledge about each other's army, troop morale, weapons systems and general fighting capabilities available down to the end of the decade. With the evacuation of the last occupation contingents in June 1930, however, this major source of Anglo-French military contacts was lost.
Thereafter, relations between the two armies became more attenuated and information grew harder to come by. The French managed to keep a more detailed watch on the British army in the early 1930s than vice versa. Their military attaché in London from 1929 to 1936, General Robert Voruz, and his long-serving assistant, Major Cuny, reported assiduously on the British army, its recruitment problems, training, and changes in the high command. These were supplemented by a long annual despatch about all aspects of life in Britain, politics and economic prospects as much as matters military, for the benefit of the intelligence branch (Deuxième Bureau) of the general staff and the War Ministry in Paris. The reports of Voruz's successor as attaché, General Albert Lelong (1936-40) , were just as comprehensive.
The British attachés in Paris were less industrious. In the time of Colonel George Waterfield and Colonel T. G. G. Heywood (1933-36) the Paris posting was considered something of a social sinecure rather than a route to promotion and senior command. 45 Such information as the British obtained in these years was thanks to Weygand and Gamelin, the most senior French commanders. Despite Beaumont-Nesbitt's endeavours, however, by 1937-38 the authorities in London grew aware of how seriously incomplete and speculative a lot of their information about the French army, its armaments and its operational plans had become. In September 1937 Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, Montgomery-Massingberd's successor as CIGS, was invited to attend the French army's exercises in Normandy. He detected an ulterior aim of impressing upon him how much it would serve British interests to co-operate, militarily, more closely with France. 49 In April 1938 Major C. A. de Linde, Beaumont-Nesbitt's assistant military attaché in Paris, confessed to London that he and the military attaché had 'not the same means' of intelligence gathering on the French armed forces as did Germany and Italy. It was 'intolerable', minuted Ismay, assistant secretary to the CID, that Britain was no longer provided with 'the exact position' from the French about 'what they can and intend to do with their army'. 50 Not only were details lacking about the order-of-battle of the French army, and the quality of their training and weapons; so was concrete information on the French army's intended wartime deployments and operational plans.
In this aspect of cross-Channel relations, there was a vicious circle to be broken: France would divulge the detail of concentrations and dispositions, and of her battle plans, when the British sat down to comprehensive staff talks. Yet until the scare over rumoured imminent German plans for a lightning coup de main against Holland in January-February 1939, the governments of Baldwin (1935-37) and Chamberlain (1937-40) regarded the price in lost political and diplomatic freedom of action as too great to warrant detailed military exchanges.
The French army high command increasingly made its demands on the War Office very specific. 51 It sought a small but highly mechanized 'Field Force' (in the terminology of the mid-1930s) to fulfil specific roles as part of Allied ground dispositions. In the early stages of a war, this British corps was sought to form a powerful, strategic mobile reserve behind the lines on a reconstituted Western Front. The protection of the frontiers was incumbent on French infantry formations in the north, and the Maginot Line and French fortress divisions from Luxembourg via Lorraine to Switzerland; behind them a mobile British field force, strongly equipped with tanks, could prepare to counter-attack any German breakthrough of the fortifications and infantry positions.
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In the subsequent stages of a war, once the Allies took the offensive, the British land contribution would become an attacking instrument to join French armour in defeating the German forces in the field, batter through to the heart of the Third Reich, and overthrow Nazism. This grand strategy in several stages presupposed the organization and harnessing together of the British and French war economies. The resources of the two empires overseas, as well as the respective metropolitan industries and treasuries, were to be mobilised. 53 This, it was universally agreed, was a cardinal 'lesson' of the 1914-18 war. Its significance is discussed here in Martin Alexander's chapter (Chapter 8) on British and French preparations for converting their economies to a war footing and interlocking their resources of money, materiel and men into an Allied economic war effort. Grand strategy was predicated on a war of four years' duration, and of at least two distinct phases. The first would be defensive, characterized by the build-up of Allied mobilized strength, letting a blockade squeeze the enemy whilst the Allies withstood assaults by Germany and its satellites. The second would be offensive, to destroy a weakened and war-ravaged Reich. The 'Broad Strategic Policy for the Allied Conduct of the War', agreed in the first stage of Anglo-French staff talks in early April 1939, remarked that Germany and Italy cannot hope to increase their resources appreciably in the course of the war: they will therefore stake their chances of success on a short war. The United Kingdom and France, on the other hand, are in a position to increase their war potential from one month to another. 54 To harness and pool economic resources, some far-sighted moves had been initiated by 1939-40. Supply of British coal to French power stations and the steel industry was an example. There were also financial offsets, and mechanisms to share the war's fiscal burdens were included in the Anglo-French Treasury agreements of 4 December 1939.
As William Philpott's chapter (Chapter 9) shows, a comprehensive system of economic committees was envisaged as part of the allies' Supreme War Council machinery. Steps were even taken towards tank and anti-aircraft-gun manufacture that hinted at the joint weapons production commonplace later in the war. However, as in other areas of the Allied strategic relationship, what was accomplished proved to be too little and too late.
Similarly promising, but incomplete, was the arrangement of the higher direction of the war. Here, as William Philpott's contribution shows, politicians and military chiefs in London and Paris sought to embed and institutionalize the 'lessons' of 1914-18 from the outset. In particular they drew on the valuable role performed by the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council (SWC) after its establishment in 1917, and were intent on forming an identical body. This was achieved as one offshoot of the three rounds of comprehensive Anglo-French staff talks in 1939. 55 The inaugural SWC meeting took place only nine days after war was declared, at Abbeville, on 12 September 1939. 56 Sundry associated or parallel bodies designed to achieve the well-oiled integration of the French and British war efforts existed from the start of hostilities in 1939: an Anglo-French Military Committee and an Anglo-French industrial Co-ordination Committee (both located in London), and an Anglo-French Joint Purchasing Commission in the United States (identified, correctly, as a key source of raw materials, machine-tools and weapons, notably fighter aircraft). 57 Britain and France were not just European powers in the inter-war years and in the second world war -they were imperial ones too. Indeed, in Britain's case she defined herself first and foremost as an imperial power. For British leaders, and only slightly less for those in France, attention to the German question had always to be balanced by care for other security and defence issues. 58 This was so during the reparations wrangles of the 1920s as much as when the Third Reich posed a growing military threat after 1933. 59 61 This need became more pressing. In November the chiefs of staff urgently recommended that, with a growing risk of a catastrophic war against Germany, Italy and Japan together, Britain's diplomats bestir themselves to reduce the number of the nation's prospective enemies. 62 Unfortunately for Anglo-French harmony, however, French strategists and politicians became more hostile towards Italy in 1937-38 . Some enthused about the Mediterranean as a promising arena for an offensive if war occurred. 63 Promoted by Admiral François Darlan, chief of the French naval staff and General Jules Bührer (chief of staff of colonial troops, 1938-40), plans were drafted for French army, air and naval forces to attack from Tunisia, Djibouti, Corsica and Provence to knock out fascist Italy, now seriously damaged by its imbroglio in Spain. Britain and France finally embarked on staff talks and war planning for the Mediterranean in May 1939. 64 However, the divergent policies of the previous three years meant that strategy against Italy was another subject on which Anglo-French co-ordination had an impossible amount of ground to make up. 65 The question of Italy influenced Anglo-French relations in Europe and the colonies. Martin Thomas's chapter (Chapter 7) focuses on relations in the domain of colonial defence. Despite the importance of empire for each Entente power, the military resources they devoted to imperial security were modest. 66 Britain was gravely stretched in the Mediterranean, even though the potential enemy, Italy, was itself riddled with strategic, economic and operational weaknesses. 67 French notions of offensive action to conquer Italy's overseas possessions (Libya, Somaliland and Abyssinia) were unrealistic, because French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) had not been developed as a major military base or reserve arsenal for arms manufacture. 68 Before 1914 the French colonies further from home (West Africa, Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, Indochina) were attracting the ambitions of General Charles Mangin. It became Mangin's dream to constitute the natives into a bottomless human reservoir of fierce shock troops, and this idea was the genesis of France's legendary force noire in 1915-18. 69 At best the French empire was still seen in this light during the 1930s; but the long-term neglect of imperial infrastructure, arsenals and bases meant it was in 1940 a downright liability. The indefensibility of the colonies rendered academic the desperate, panicky talk, as Paris fell, of continuing the war from 'Overseas France'. 70 Because of distance and geographical isolation, naval forces were the key to an Anglo-French strategy for imperial defence. 71 However, as Anthony Clayton's chapter here (Chapter 2) suggests, relations between the British and French naval staffs were arguably the most frosty of all between the wars. The 1935 Anglo-German naval agreement was negotiated behind the backs of the French. Worse, with cavalier disregard for French feelings, the agreement was made public on 18 June, anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. 72 The troubled Anglo-French naval relationship of the 1930s was only temporarily eased by the joint patrols undertaken to police the 1937 Nyon Convention on non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War. 73 The more commonplace frictions and misunderstandings, however, set the fleets on course for the tragic 'end of the affair' at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. 74 Inadequate inter-war investment in imperial defence came home to roost for both Britain and France -not just in the Mediterranean in 1939-41, but in the exposure of both allies' Far Eastern territories (Singapore, Hong Kong and Indochina) once Japan joined the war in December 1941. 75 The transformation of these episodic and conditional inter-war Anglo-French relationships into a genuine Anglo-French alliance was, therefore, as Talbot Imlay demonstrates (Chapter 5), very much the work of rapid improvization in 1938-39. 76 What was forced into existence at the eleventh hour reflected an increasingly frantic effort to catch up lost time.
In almost every facet of the cross-Channel relationship re-examined in this volume, the new light shed from the archives, especially from the French ones, reveals a tantalizing potential for an integrated, systematic and pragmatic partnership. A relationship of this sort was essential to defeat Germany -let alone withstand, and then defeat, the Axis as a whole. British and French military chiefs, civil servants and some ministers had hatched embryonic schemes that would be cloned much more successfully by the Anglo-American alliance of 1942-45. Time and again there is evidence of thinking, and sometimes of acting, along the lines that became second nature later in the war to their Anglo-American successors. 77 In the case of the first, incomplete, alliance against Hitler, the AngloFrench one of 1939-40, practical lessons drawn from coalition war in 1914-18 were offset by the deep psychological scars of that conflict. 78 These scars limited the commitment and clouded the judgement of those preparing to run the new Anglo-French war strategy. Defeat in 1940 allowed the replacement of the men who began at the top on the British side, Field-Marshal Lord Gort, General Sir Edmund Ironside and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall. Their replacements were more 'alliance-minded' in their direction of Britain's war effort. Despite the common endeavours of the first world war, separate languages and cultures, and recriminations about who had frittered away the victory of 1919 undermined Anglo-French efforts to do better in 1939-40. 79 As a result, coalition co-ordination was too fragile to withstand the blows inflicted by Germany in May and June 1940. Inter-war Anglo-French defence relations were more substantial than most accounts have allowed; but they remained much less substantial than the terrible tests of a new war would require.
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